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‘The napalm and pellet bombs, the systematic destruction of a heroic people 
are a barbarous rehearsal. The starving and the suffering will no longer die in 
silence. We must discredit the arrogant demand that they protect our comfort 
with their quiet agony.’1 
 
Fifty years have passed since the International War Crimes Tribunal for Vietnam was convened 
by the philosopher and anti-war activist Bertrand Russell. Its goal was to investigate US crimes 
in Vietnam—not to punish individual perpetrators but to inform public opinion and arouse 
opposition to the war in ‘the smug streets of Europe and the complacent cities of North 
America’.2 Given the eventual size of the anti-war movement, it is easy to forget just how 
complacent much of the US public still was in the mid-60s, as the Johnson administration 
unleashed Operation Rolling Thunder. The obfuscations of the Western media kept the worst 
of US aggression off front pages and television screens and a large majority of Americans still 
favoured further escalation.3 
 
A conscientious objector in the First World War, Russell had a long history of anti-war activism 
and was outspoken in opposition to US aggression in Vietnam. In a 1963 letter to the New York 
Times, Russell wrote that American conduct in Vietnam was ‘reminiscent of warfare as 
practiced by the Germans in Eastern Europe and the Japanese in South East Asia’.4 US actions, 
Russell was convinced, amounted to war crimes. In June 1966, Russell issued an ‘Appeal to 
American Conscience’, announcing that he was approaching ‘eminent jurists, literary figures 
and men of public affairs’ from around the world to constitute an International War Crimes 
Tribunal. The Tribunal, Russell proclaimed, would provide ‘the most exhaustive portrayal of 
what has happened to the people of Vietnam. We intend that the peoples of the world shall be 
aroused as never before, the better to prevent the repetition of this tragedy elsewhere.’5 Russell, 
by then in his mid-90s, would serve as honorary president, while the French philosopher Jean-
Paul Sartre would take on the role of executive president, and the Yugoslav historian Vladimir 
Dedijer that of chairman and president of sessions. They were joined by an international 
assortment of prominent figures—Simone de Beauvoir, Lelio Basso, James Baldwin, Isaac 
Deutscher, Mahmud Ali Kasuri, Peter Weiss, Lázaro Cárdenas, Lawrence Daly, and others.  
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Five months later, in November 1966, a preliminary meeting was held in London. The 
Tribunal, Russell told the gathered members, was to be convened ‘so that we may investigate 
and assess the character of the United States’ war in Vietnam’. There was ‘no clear historical 
precedent’, although the Nuremberg Tribunal, flawed as it was, offered an example: an 
expression of outrage at the actions of the Nazis and an attempt to devise criteria against which 
such actions could be judged and according to which they might be condemned. Nonetheless, 
the Vietnam Tribunal, if inspired by similar sentiments, would be markedly different. Lacking 
force majeure and backed by no state, it could not hope to compel individuals to stand accused 
or to impose sanctions. These, though, were not limitations, Russell insisted, but rather virtues: 
unencumbered by reasons of state, the Tribunal was free to undertake its ‘solemn and historic 
investigation’ impartially and ‘record the truth in Vietnam’.6 
 
Earlier that year, Russell had written to President Johnson inviting him to appear before the 
Tribunal to defend US actions and answer the evidence of US atrocities.7 The invitation went 
unanswered. When a further invitation was extended, by Sartre to Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk, the latter remarked glibly to reporters that he had no intention of ‘playing games with a 
94-year-old Briton’.8 In private, though, US officials expressed concern about the Tribunal and 
its potential impact. In July 1966, an interagency group chaired by Under Secretary of State 
George Ball and composed of officials from the State Department, CIA, US Information 
Agency, and Department of Defense was charged with discrediting Russell and the Tribunal 
and, if possible, preventing its meetings.9 The next month, Ball reported to the President that 
the group was ‘quietly exploring with the British and French available legal steps that could be 
taken to forestall this spectacle. We also plan to stimulate press articles criticizing the “trials” 
and detailing the unsavory and leftwing background of the organizers and judges.’10  
 
The propaganda campaign was successful in the US, where supplicant media rehearsed State 
Department aspersions: the Tribunal was ‘a farce’ whose members were ‘not interested in 
peace’, a group of anti-Americans spreading communist propaganda.11 According to the New 
York Times, Russell was ‘a full-time purveyor of political garbage indistinguishable from the 
routine products of the Soviet machine’ who had ‘sunk to defending—not just denying or 
minimizing, but actively defending—the atrocities of the Viet Cong in Vietnam’.12 The White 
House, Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach happily reported to President Johnson, 
had provided the background for the smear.13  
 
Less hyperbolic was the claim that the Tribunal was biased, its members hostile to US policy 
and their verdict predetermined. In the face of such reproach, Russell remained unapologetic. 
We must reject the view, Russell insisted at the Tribunal’s London meeting, ‘that only 
indifferent men are impartial men’. Open minds were not to be confused with empty ones. 
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Every day brought new prima facie evidence of crimes in Vietnam and the Tribunal’s members 
could not help but have feelings about them. Quite the contrary: ‘[n]o man unacquainted with 
this evidence through indifference has any claim to judge it’.14  
 
For Sartre, too, such complaints misconstrued the nature of the Tribunal. ‘There is no question 
of judging whether American policy in Vietnam is evil’, he told Le Nouvel Observateur in 
November 1966. Of this, ‘most of us have not the slightest doubt’. The task of the Tribunal 
was narrower: to determine the legality of that policy and its concomitant actions—do they 
fall, specifically, ‘within the compass of international law on war crimes’? On this question, 
Sartre insisted, ‘our judgements cannot be given in advance, even if we are committed, as 
individuals, in the struggle against imperialism. . . . This war is certainly contrary to the 
interests of the vast majority of people, but is it legally criminal? That is what we will try to 
determine’.15 
 
What of the alleged NLF atrocities of which the New York Times complained? Even fervent 
opponents of imperial machinations reproached the Tribunal for not judging the Vietnamese at 
the same time as the US. The radical historian Staughton Lynd, outspoken against the war, 
declined an invitation to participate in the Tribunal, arguing that it was employing a ‘double 
standard’ in evaluating the acts of only one side of the conflict.16 For Sartre, such complaints 
rang hollow, the implicit equation of US and Vietnamese actions nonsensical. ‘I refuse to place 
in the same category the actions of an organization of poor peasants, hunted, obliged to 
maintain an iron discipline in their ranks, and those of an immense army backed up by a highly 
industrialized country of 200 million inhabitants.’17 Russell was no less impatient with false 
equivalences. ‘Who would compare the 100,000 tons of napalm with a peasant holding a rifle’, 
he would soon ask the Tribunal. ‘Who can fail to distinguish the power which destroys the 
hospitals and schools of an entire people from the defenders who attack the aeroplanes carrying 
napalm and steel fragmentation bombs?’18  
 
Nonetheless, Washington’s machinations proved effective in impeding the Tribunal’s 
preparations. Russell and Sartre had initially planned to hold the Tribunal in Paris, only for the 
French to deny its members visas. Such petty obstructions led Sartre, in April 1967, to appeal 
directly to President de Gaulle. ‘Justice of any sort’, de Gaulle responded, ‘in principle as in 
execution, emanates from the State’. The Tribunal, ‘through its very form . . . would be acting 
against the very thing which it is seeking to uphold’.19 Not at all, shot back Sartre: ‘Real justice 
must draw its force both from the state and the masses.’ The Tribunal did not claim, whatever 
de Gaulle affected to believe, to substitute itself for any existing court. It was precisely the 
institutional vacuum left by self-interested states and a cowed UN that required people of 
conscience to carry forward the Nuremberg legacy.20 De Gaulle was not to be moved, however 
unconvincing his dissembling: the Palais de l’Élysée had already assured the US embassy the 
previous month that the Tribunal would be banned from French soil.21  
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In Britain, Harold Wilson’s government, faithfully subservient to Washington, followed suit, 
refusing visas to North Vietnamese witnesses and condemning the Tribunal as one-sided. 
Russell and Sartre eventually found a reluctant host in Sweden, Prime Minister Tage Erlander 
confiding to his British counterpart that despite the ‘considerable political embarrassment’ 
caused by the Tribunal, he simply lacked the legal power to prevent it.22  
 
The Tribunal’s first session opened finally on 2 May 1967 in Stockholm. Age and ill health 
prevented Russell from attending, but his opening statement, a passionate indictment of the 
war and a call for the Tribunal to work diligently to record the truth of Vietnam, was read by 
his secretary, Ralph Schoenman. Eight days of hearings followed with testimony heard from 
Vietnamese witnesses as well as a potpourri of experts: lawyers, doctors, biochemists, 
agronomists, sociologists, historians, journalists. A second session was convened between 20 
November and 1 December in Roskilde, Denmark.  
 
To read the Tribunal record today is to read a catalogue of atrocity—‘a litany of pain’, as one 
contemporary observer put it.23 There are the sober reports of weapons experts, doctors, 
scientists—on the fragmentation or cluster bombs designed specifically to maim; on the 
medical effects of napalm; on the use and consequences of chemical weapons and defoliation 
and the destruction of dykes and irrigation systems. There are the reports from members of the 
Tribunal’s fact-finding missions to North Vietnam, first-hand accounts of the ravages of 
napalm—‘his ears just melted’—and evidence of deliberate targeting of civilians—village after 
village obliterated; hospitals, schools, churches bombed, far removed from any military target. 
And then there is the testimony of survivors: the prisoner of war tortured; the young school 
teacher, Ngo Thi Nga, asleep with her pupils in a small village classroom when the American 
bombs fell; the nine-year-old Do Van Ngoc, herding cattle under a rain of napalm—‘on my 
right hand, the thumb is stuck to the other fingers; large scars remain on my stomach and my 
thighs’.24 Kenneth Tynan, the English theatre critic and writer, attended the Stockholm session 
and recalls seeing the young boy’s testimony: 
 
He strips off his jacket, shirt and pants, and is suddenly naked, in a blaze of 
light. Above the waist he’s unmarked; but his belly, thighs and groin are burned 
to a deep-brown crisp, corrugated like the crackling on a roast of pork. . . . Shock 
inscribes the image on my retina. Mention Vietnam today and that is what I see. 
If you dismiss it as a mere propaganda display, I can only agree with you, and 
pity you. It was propaganda; but it was propagating a symbolic and 
demonstrable truth.25 
 
Russell and Sartre had hoped to arouse anger in the West and galvanise opposition to the war. 
In October, between the Tribunal’s two sessions, 100,000 protestors marched on the Pentagon. 
How many of them knew of the Tribunal and its vast catalogue of US excesses? Media 
coverage in the US was fleeting and deeply unfavourable, largely indistinguishable from 
official efforts to delegitimise the hearings. As the Stockholm session drew to a close, the CIA 
happily reported to President Johnson that the Tribunal ‘has gone rather badly’, in part due to 
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lack of ‘good press’.26 The Roskilde session went largely ignored by Americans. Indeed, 
awareness of the atrocities visited on Vietnam remained low in the US where opposition, when 
it did grow, centred largely around the balance sheet of American lives. Even after My Lai in 
1968, most Americans continued to believe their government’s insistence that Pinkville was 
an isolated incident; William Calley simply, as Vice President Agnew put it, a ‘bad apple’.  
 
If the Tribunal had little immediate impact on bien pensant opinion, its effects were felt 
elsewhere. The Tribunal played a central role in associating international law, and specifically 
the idea of ‘war crimes’, with the war in Vietnam. A handful of legal challenges had been 
mounted in the US prior to the Tribunal by conscientious objectors opposing the draft, but these 
had focused largely on the conscience of the objector, not the legality of US actions.27 As late 
as 1965, Henry Cabot Lodge, then US Ambassador in Saigon, could tell reporters: ‘As far as 
I’m concerned, the legal aspect of [the war] is of no significance’.28 The Russell Tribunal 
placed the question of the war’s legality squarely in the public eye with its insistence that the 
war was not only morally reprehensible, but also criminal.29 Such association, Sartre in 
particular had felt, was important in arousing opposition amongst the ‘petit bourgeois masses’ 
who were indifferent to the necessity, crimes or no crimes, of the struggle against imperialism. 
‘[I]t is by means of legalism’, he believed, ‘that their eyes can be opened’.30 The juridification 
of war over the following decades and the over-investment in international law of today’s anti-
war movement—to the extent one exists—might, in hindsight, have given him pause. 
 
By far the Tribunal’s most lasting legacy has been the tradition of peoples’ tribunals, which it 
inaugurated, and which continues to bear Russell’s stamp. In 1973, the Italian jurist Lelio 
Basso, a participant in Stockholm and Roskilde, organised a second Russell Tribunal focused 
on human rights violations in Latin America. Subsequent tribunals have investigated rights 
violations in West Germany (1978-79) and, with respect to native Americans, in the US (1980). 
Basso, meanwhile, established a Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal in Rome, which sought to 
institutionalise the tradition. In December 2000, the Women’s International War Crimes 
Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery convened in Tokyo to consider the responsibility 
of Japanese political and military authorities for sexual slavery and rampant sexual violence in 
Asia and the Pacific during the 1930s and 40s. In 2005, a World Tribunal on Iraq investigated 
war crimes charges against British and American political and military leaders. From 2010 to 
2014, a Russell Tribunal on Palestine held sessions in Barcelona, London and Cape Town. And 
in recent years, peoples’ tribunals have been organised on issues ranging from the 1965 
Indonesian politicide to the Canadian mining industry in Latin America to Monsanto’s 
responsibility for ecocide.31 
 
To mark the 50th anniversary of the Russell Tribunal, the London Review of International Law 
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is reprinting, below, Bertrand Russell’s opening statement to the first session of the 
International War Crimes Tribunal, delivered by Ralph Schoenman on his behalf on 2 May 
1967 in Stockholm. We also include in this issue of the journal an interview with the journalist 
and veteran anti-war campaigner Tariq Ali, in which he reflects on his involvement with the 




Bertrand Russell’s Opening statement at the International War Crimes Tribunal, 
Stockholm, 2 May 196732 
 
The world is numbed by the arrogant brutality of the United States Government. We meet in 
this opening session of the International War Crimes Tribunal at an alarming time. The United 
States is beginning an enormous new onslaught against the people of Vietnam. The sordid 
military machine which rules Washington is readying itself for greater destruction. In a fever 
of frustration over the humiliating defeats inflicted on her occupying armies in South Vietnam, 
the United States Government in hysteria and hate boasts of its intent, and its intent is evil. 
 
Our Tribunal is not a group of disembodied formalists, quibbling over definitions or posturing 
an immoral lack of decision about these events. There is one reason for this International War 
Crimes Tribunal: Overwhelming evidence besieges us daily of crimes without precedent. Each 
moment greater horror is perpetrated against the people of Vietnam. We investigate in order to 
expose. We document in order to indict. We arouse consciousness in order to create mass 
resistance. This is our purpose and the acid test of our integrity and honour. 
 
How frantic is the United States Government to stop us. Lies are hurled like napalm bombs. 
The fragments of these planned untruths find their way into the media of communication so 
responsible for the deception of ignorant men. The Government of France exposes itself before 
the world as a pathetic citadel of hypocrisy and spinelessness. 
 
This is no token of our weakness. It is the very opposite. The feverish effort to conceal 
American crimes is matched by the frantic campaign against those who stand out against them. 
Let us take this as a tribute. 
 
Hitler’s Nazis buried the evidence of their barbarism throughout Europe. This Europe is a vast 
grave of interred cruelty. Auschwitz did its work for years. The evidence cannot be denied. 
 
When Nazi power was defeated belatedly, did anyone lack knowledge of the extermination and 
experiment, of the cold cruelty and arrogance of the Nazi war criminals? The evidence was 
overwhelming. 
 
Must we contort ourselves to deny the equally compelling evidence of war crimes in Vietnam? 
It is unseemly for men with a particle of self-respect to dissemble about what the United States 
Government has done to Vietnam. Auschwitz existed. It was all the more incumbent upon men 
to investigate why it was built, what it did and who was responsible. The vast evidence was no 
reason to hold back from enquiry; it was a mandate to expose, in the vain hope that men might 
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learn the shameful lesson of their moral cowardice—for Auschwitz is our responsibility. We 
failed to stop it. We condemned it too late. 
 
Crimes, barbarous crimes, are reported daily from Vietnam. They are crimes of an aggressor, 
an occupier, a tormentor. Our task is to display this truth to the people of the world. Our duty 
is to investigate every fact so that every fact will serve to arouse passionate resistance. We do 
this because we have knowledge which compels us to act against inhuman behaviour. Those 
who wish to apologise for US crimes and who would excuse their own failure to act against 
them will try to impose a distinction between moral clarity and intellectual probity. In doing 
so they project their own double default. We must state the evidence before our eyes. Without 
this overwhelming evidence there would have been no Tribunal. Where crime is known, it is 
cause for enquiry and judgment. The truth compels an exhaustive investigation to document 
and compile the full record. 
 
The full record includes the moving and unparalleled resistance of the people of Vietnam. 
Those who would call the rising of the Warsaw Ghetto a crime will consider the resistance in 
Vietnam in the same light. Those who lack all feeling for the heroism of the partisans in 
Yugoslavia, Denmark and Norway will seek to equate the relentless annihilation of Vietnam 
by the U.S. rulers with the valiant resistance of the Vietnamese partisans. Let apologists for 
Nazism make this equation. There is no truth in it, less honour in its advocacy and complete 
moral turpitude in its imposition. 
 
The force of our Tribunal lies in the impeccability of its procedures and the thoroughness of its 
investigation. The evidence we marshall will be undeniable. Let us rest confident in this 
mission. Let us repudiate the demand that we feign ignorance of the Lidices and Guernicas 
occurring daily in Vietnam. 
 
Our enquiry is inspired by deep conviction. That is its strength. When brutal crimes are 
committed, conviction is a test of respect for facts and the courage to display that respect. 
 
It is good that Sweden has received us. To our supporters we owe much gratitude. They deserve 
the credit for ensuring that the democratic achievements of Sweden are not submerged. This 
too is part of the struggle of our time. Weak men protect cruel men. Good men are the victims 
of both. When the Dewey Commission met in the United States no one used the absurd sanctity 
of a head of state to equate a brave historic enquiry by renowned men with insult. Politesse is 
not at issue. The right to criticise men of power should be inviolate even if governments are 
more culpable than any individual spokesmen for them. It is our historic duty to transform 
cruelty and cowardice by upholding values on which civilization has always depended. 
 
We do not supplicate for the right to investigate the crimes of war committed by Western 
governments in Vietnam: we demand it. We do not hesitate about the connection between our 
knowledge of crimes and the necessity to test this knowledge in public enquiry: we proclaim 
it. Moral purpose cannot be separated from the concern for truth. The burning children of 
Vietnam are martyred by the Western world. Their suffering, like that of the gassed Jews of 
Auschwitz, is a basic feature of the civilisation which we have built. There is, however, another 
part of our culture which has also been built and which has produced our own martyrs over the 
centuries. This Tribunal is in the tradition of that struggle and of that achievement: our art, our 
science, our music, our humanity. 
 
It is our culture which is at stake. It is our barbarism which menaces it. It is not possible to 
organise society for plunder and mass murder without terrifying consequences. Our scientists 
and engineers, our chemists and researchers, our technology and economic system have been 
mobilised for murder. 
 
In Vietnam we have done what Hitler did in Europe. We shall suffer the degradation of Nazi 
Germany unless we act. ‘Untermensch’ is a word which lives again in the vocabulary of 
powerful men in Washington who speak of ‘yellow dwarfs’ and ‘coonskins’. 
 
The pity is not in the suffering of Vietnam. Her people resist and are heroic. The pity is in the 
smug streets of Europe and the complacent cities of North America so debased as to be 
indifferent even as our own fate is enacted in Vietnam. 
 
The International War Crimes Tribunal is a revolutionary tribunal. We have no armies and no 
gallows. We lack power, even the power of mass communication. It is overdue that those 
without power sit in judgement over those who have it. This test we must meet, alone if need 
be. We are responsible before history. 
 
